{3d02 agere ^ patere, actio^passio} NOT actu   [what means ^ ?]

Meaning Agere: acting. But acting in the very strict and technical sense of mind causing itself to be the sufficient condition for something to happen. An operation is an "action, act", relative to some effect iff the operating thing alone (in se) explains the effect. Else the operation is "in alio", a passion. There are no third possibilities.
An operation can technically be an action relative to one effect and a passion (partial cause) relative to another (think of collateral damage). Things in alio like windmills and planetary systems "work" (operare) in the patere-sense.
Mantras [what is] corporis agendi potentia
Related concepts Agere and patere are two complement types of operare
Occurrence [geomap] Preoccurs from {1d07}
NOT linked: Agere when used for passive operations as in ad ... agendum ... determinatur , and in  {4p59}. Patet (obvious, trivial, for a proof).
{2d03 idea}                                                                                          ...percipere is passive, concipere is active ... puzzling is that passion is causation, and percipere is across attributes (the mind perceives the body), so percipere seems beyond the intended range of {2p07} [more: pp1a03 causa effectus] ...
....idea...mental conception.... ... ideam ...mentis conceptum .....
...I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind. ...Dico potius conceptum quam perceptionem quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur mentem ab objecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.
2p29s rerum nempe fortuito occursu                                        ... actio and passio of the mind provisionally explained using the terms externa and interna ...
... the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below ... ... mens nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adaequatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit hoc est quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam ...
{3d03 affectus}                                                                                   ...a second intelligo-definition of agere is included in the definition of affectus...
... By emotion I mean ...If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications [Lat: affectiones], I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive. ... Per affectum intelligo ... Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo, alias passionem. 
{3p01 mens agit patitur ideas}                                                   ...the linchpin holding Ethica together...why man can be active...proven from the relation between idea adaequata and causa adaequata...
...Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive... ...Mens nostra quaedam agit, quaedam vero patitur nempe quatenus adaequatas habet ideas eatenus quaedam necessario agit et quatenus ideas habet inadaequatas eatenus necessario quaedam patitur. ..
...In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused ...Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind ... and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise ...  adequate in God, not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he, at the same time, ... ...Cujuscunque humanae mentis ideae ali adaequatae sunt, ali autem mutilatae et confusae... Ideae autem quae in alicujus mente sunt adaequatae, sunt in Deo adaequatae quatenus ejusdem mentis essentiam constituit ... et quae deinde inadaequatae sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo ... adaequatae non quatenus ejusdem solummodo mentis essentiam sed etiam quatenus...
...N.B. the curious: ...minds of other things....aliarum rerum mentes...
...contains the minds of other things... ...aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet...
 ...Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow ... God is the adequate cause ... not inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea ... ...Deinde ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet ...cujus ... Deus causa est adaequata  ... non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur ...
...But of that effect whereof God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind, of that effect ... the mind in question is the adequate cause... ...At ejus effectus cujus Deus est causa quatenus affectus est idea quae in alicujus mente est adaequata, illa eadem mens est causa adaequata ...
...Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas ... is in certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point... ... Ergo mens nostra ...quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, quaedam necessario agit, quod erat primum...
... whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of such an effect ... the mind of the given man is not an adequate, but only a partial cause... ... quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea quae in Deo est adaequata, non quatenus mentem unius hominis tantum sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum ejusdem hominis mente in se habet, ejus  ... illius hominis mens non est causa adaequata sed partialis ...
... the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was our second point... ... mens quatenus ideas inadaequatas habet, quaedam necessario patitur. Quod erat secundum...
{3p28 ad laetitiam conducere conamur promovere}           ...here it looks like the human body can be acting, but that the counterpart-operation of the mind is called NOT action, but thinking...
...the endeavour of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power of action... ... mentis conatus seu [mng eqv] potentia in cogitando qualis et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu [mng eqv] potentia in agendo ...
{3p58 affectus dantur agimus}                                                      ...locus in Pars III where attention is shifted from "passive" emotions to "active" emotions...
...Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. ...praeter laetitiam et cupiditatem quae passiones sunt, alii laetitiam et cupiditatis affectus dantur qui ad nos quatenus agimus, referuntur.
....When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure...[it] necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea ...[it] does conceive certain adequate ideas ...Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it is active ....the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being ...by such an endeavour we mean desire ....therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or ...in so far as we are active.... ....Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, laetatur ...  autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur quando veram sive [mng-eqv] adaequatam ideam concipit .... At ...quasdam ideas adaequatas concipit ....: ergo eatenus etiam laetatur quatenus ideas adaequatas concipit hoc est ... quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur :... at per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus ...; ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus sive [prf-eqv] ...quatenus agimus...
4apx hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui   ...desires, understood through our nature alone...
...Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions... ...Cupiditates quae ex nostra natura ita sequuntur ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi, sunt illae quae ad mentem referuntur quatenus haec ideis adaequatis constare concipitur; reliquae vero cupiditates ad mentem non referuntur nisi quatenus res inadaequate concipit et quarum vis et incrementum non humana sed rerum quae extra nos sunt potentia definiri debet et ideo illae recte actiones, hae autem passiones vocantur...
...Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad. ...nostrae actiones hoc est cupiditates illae quae hominis potentia seu ratione definiuntur, semper bonae sunt, reliquae autem tam bonae quam malae possunt esse.
...all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good... ..omnia illa quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt...
{4p63c bonum directe malum indirecte}                               ...Pleasurable emotions can be passive but those pleasurable emotions that spring from reason can not...
Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive ... DEMONSTRATIO: Nam cupiditas quae ex ratione oritur, ex solo laetitiae affectu quae passio non est, oriri potest ...

5p10s efficere possumus ut non malis affectibus afficiamur ... a curious practical quick start reordering guide for minds ... containing many new expressions denoting actions, actiones in the technical sense, of the mind, such as: memoriae mandare, continuo applicare, in promptu habere ... (see there)

... The best we can do ... so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to ... Optimum ... quod efficere possumus quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est ...
5p20s nullum affectum directe contrarius                          ... features a summary quoted here, with references, of the mind's power over the emotions, that is: a summary of what enables the mind to be active in the technical sense ...
... the mind's power over the emotions consists:--
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V. ii. and V. iv. note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications [Lat: affectiones][17] are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.) ...		 ... mentis in affectus potentiam consistere
I. in ipsa affectuum cognitione (vide scholium propositionis 4 hujus 5p04s).
II. in eo quod affectus a cogitatione  causae externae quam confuse imaginamur, separat (vide propositionem 2 {5p02} cum scholio propositionis 4 hujus 5p04s).
III. in tempore quo affectiones quae ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant quae ad res referuntur quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus (vide propositionem 7 hujus).
IV. in multitudine causarum a quibus affectiones quae ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur (vide propositiones 9 {5p09} et 11 {5p11} hujus).
V. denique in ordine quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest (vide scholium propositionis 10 5p10s et insuper propositiones 12 {5p12}, 13 {5p13} et 14 {5p14} hujus).
Equivalence claims involving agere^patere, actio^passio
{1d07} [notes] 1. free 2. that thing which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. 1. libera 2. Ea res  quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur.
{2d07} [notes] 1. particular things 2. things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing. 1. [res] singulares 2. [res] quae finitae sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua in una actione ita concurrant ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.
{2p48} [About the mind] 1. the cause of their actions can not be free 2. it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and not willing [De menti] 1. suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera 2. absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest
{3d02} [notes] 1. acting 2. anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause  3. through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. 1. agere 2. aliquid in nobis aut [excl exh] extra nos fit cujus adaequata sumus causa 3. ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut [excl exh] extra nos sequitur quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi.
{3d02} [notes] 1. Being passive as regards something 2. something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally of which we are only the partial cause. 1. pati aliquid 2. in nobis aliquid fit vel [non-excl non-exh] ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causa. 
{3d03} [notes] [About the human body] 1. [corporeal BH] emotion 2. the affections of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained [De corpori humani] 1. affectum [affectus-corpus] 2. corporis affectiones quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur, juvatur vel [excl non-exh] coercetur
{3d03} [notes] [About the human mind] 1. [mental BH] emotion  2. the ideas of the affections of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained
 [De menti humani] 1. affectum [affectus-mens] 2.  ideas corporis affection[um] quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel [excl non-exh] minuitur, juvatur vel [excl non-exh] coercetur
{3d03} [notes] [About mental and corporeal emotions] 1. Action 2. An affection of ours of which we are the adequate cause. [De affectuum-mentis et affectuum-corpus] 1. actio 2. affectio nostra adaequate causata nobis
{3d03} [notes] [About mental and corporeal emotions] 1. Passion 2. An affection of ours of which we are not the adequate cause. [De affectuum-mentis et affectuum-corpus] 1. passionem 2. affectio nostra non adaequate causata nobis
{3p07} [About res] 1. wherefore the power of any given thing 2. the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavours to act 3. the power or endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being, 4. the given or actual essence of the thing in question. [De rei] 1.quare cujuscunque rei potentia 2. conatus quo ipsa vel [excl exh]  sola vel [excl exh] cum aliis quidquam agit vel [non-excl non-exh] agere conatur 3. potentia sive [mng eqv]  conatus quo in suo esse perseverare conatur 4. ipsius rei datam sive [mng eqv]  actualem essentiam.
{3p28} [About the human body] 1. endeavour 2. power to act [De corpori humani] 1. conatu 2. potentia in agendo
{3p31} 1.  simultaneously love and shrink from it 2. be subject to vacillation 2. 1. eodem tempore amabimus et aversabimur 2. animi fluctuationem patiemur.
{3p55} 1. The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do 2.  it is the mind's nature to imagine only such things as assert its power of activity 1. Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat 2. de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt
{3p55c2} 1. power to act 2. endeavour 1. agendi potentia 2. conatus
{3p55c2} 1. power to act 2. endeavour 1. agendi potentiam 2. virtutem
{4p24} 1. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue 2. to act 3. to live 4. preserve one's being 1. Ex virtute absolute agere 2. ex ductu rationis agere 3. vivere 4. suum esse conservare
{4p35c2} [About people] 1. seeks what is useful to him 2. endeavours to preserve himself 3. endowed with virtue 4. endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature 5. live in obedience to reason. [De hominum] 1. utile quaerit 2. se conservare conatur 3. virtute praeditus [est] 4. potentia praeditus est ad agendum ex suae naturae legibus 5. [potentia praeditus est ad] vivendum ex ductu rationis
{4p52} [About people] 1. power to act 2. virtue 3. reason [De hominum] 1. agendi potentia 2. virtus 3. ratio
{4p53} 1. understands himself 2. his power of activity is aided. 1. se intelligit 2. ipsius agendi potentia juvatur.